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Sexual Harassment by Any Other Name 
Brian Soucek† and Vicki Schultz†† 
INTRODUCTION 
Last year, the New York Times won a Pulitzer for its reporting on 
sexual harassment.1 Yet the Times does not seem to understand what 
“sexual harassment” actually means. In both the definition it employs 
and its choices of what stories to cover, the nation’s newspaper of record 
continues to spread an overtly sexualized conception of sexual harass-
ment that, from a legal and social sciences perspective, is twenty years 
out of date. 
This Essay’s goal is, first, to call attention to this misdirection and 
its harms. By defining away and often failing to report on the endless 
ways employees are undermined, excluded, sabotaged, ridiculed, or as-
saulted because of their sex—even if not through words or actions that 
are “sexual” in nature—the Times neglects the forms of sexual harass-
ment at work that researchers repeatedly find most pervasive.2 
In this, the New York Times is hardly alone. However legally out-
dated it may be, the sexualized conception of sexual harassment—the 
view that equates sexual harassment with unwanted sexualized ad-
vances, remarks, and misconduct—is so widespread that even agencies 
charged with protecting against sexual harassment sometimes fail to 
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at the 2018 University of Chicago Legal Forum Symposium, to the editors of The University of 
Chicago Legal Forum for their patient and skillful editing, to Meghan Brooks at Yale Law School, 
and to Dean Kevin Johnson and the UC Davis School of Law for supporting this project through 
the Martin Luther King, Jr. Hall Research Fund. 
      †† Ford Foundation Professor of Law and Social Sciences, Yale Law School. I would like to thank 
the University of Chicago Legal Forum 2018 Symposium attendees for helpful feedback on the 
ideas expressed here. I am grateful to my co-author Brian Soucek, my research assistant Meghan 
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 1 The 2018 Pulitzer Prize Winner in Public Service: The New York Times, for Reporting Led 
by Jody Kantor and Megan Twohey, and The New Yorker, for Reporting by Ronan Farrow, PULITZ- 
ER (last visited Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/new-york-times-reporting-led-jodi 
-kantor-and-megan-twohey-and-new-yorker-reporting-ronan [https://perma.cc/HS8E-ESQ9]. 
 2 See infra text accompanying notes 32–47. 
228 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2019 
define it clearly in their public pronouncements.3 Indeed, the sexualized 
conception is so tenacious that scholars and legislators sometimes feel 
the need to coin a different name for harassment that lacks sexualized 
content.4 Phrases like “gender harassment” get used to distinguish sex-
ist comments and actions from the sexualized come-ons and assaults 
that many, like the Times, still exclusively associate with the term “sex-
ual harassment.”5 
Readers might wonder, what difference does it make? This Essay’s 
second aim is to show how much is at stake in what might otherwise 
seem like an academic debate over words. The news media may have 
its own reasons for clinging to the sexualized view of harassment, but 
reporters who are serious about exposing sexual harassment (and re-
formers who are serious about eliminating it) cannot afford to cling to a 
narrow sexualized definition. Rather, overcoming harassment and re-
lated injustices at work requires a reconceptualized account of sexual 
harassment—something Vicki Schultz first offered fully two decades 
ago.6 In the current #MeToo era, more than ever, we must rethink and 
reinvigorate the term “sexual harassment,” not some new term put in 
place of, or alongside, the one that is finally getting the public attention 
it has long deserved. To do otherwise risks disaggregating sexual and 
non-sexual forms of harassment, thus obscuring the larger patterns of 
hostility and exclusion that include both forms. 
Instead of trying to change the subject, this Essay aims to guide 
the contemporary conversation unleashed by activists and media to 
bring it in line with insights gained in the law, in social science, and in 
the everyday experience of workers. Amidst all the attention the #Me 
Too movement has generated, too many women and men are facing 
forms of sexual harassment that the media still ignores. 
I.   “AGREE ON DEFINITIONS” 
A. The New York Times’s Definition 
In April 2018, the New York Times won a Public Service Pulitzer 
for reporting that “uncovered the secret histories of prominent men 
across industries who were accused of sexual harassment and miscon-
duct that affected women ranging from actresses to factory workers to 
 
 3 See infra text accompanying notes 65–75. 
 4 See infra note 38. 
 5 See infra text accompanying notes 11–15. 
 6 Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998). For an 
updated account that discusses recent developments, see Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual 
Harassment, Again, 128 YALE L.J. F. 24 (2018), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/reconcep-
tualizing-sexual-harassment-again [https://perma.cc/2ZLB-LU8S]. 
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food servers.” According to the Times: “These articles . . . set off work-
place investigations, criminal inquiries—and the #MeToo movement.”7 
Powerful and influential, these articles were largely limited to one 
common narrative: a prominent man (like Harvey Weinstein) is re-
vealed to have made unwanted sexual advances, or even committed sex-
ual assaults, against women who worked for him or depended on him 
for career advancement. The reported harassment is almost always 
male-to-female, top-down, and sexualized in nature; it occurs in influ-
ential industries that receive heavy media coverage.8 The stories were 
mostly exposés about powerful bosses or benefactors in prominent com-
panies preying on female subordinates for sex. Thus, a year into its re-
porting, a headline in the Times could trumpet, “#MeToo Brought Down 
201 Powerful Men,” before going on to encapsulate the facts of each 
downfall.9 
More than just a theme that emerges in its selection of stories, the 
New York Times’s sexualized conception of sexual harassment is liter-
ally definitional.10 In a January 2018 article containing a lesson plan to 
help teachers use the paper’s #MeToo coverage to educate students 
 
 7 Harassed, N.Y. TIMES (last visited Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/spotlight/har-
ass [https://perma.cc/4Z2Q-F9HC]. 
 8 Among the fourteen articles that the Times identifies as connected to its Pulitzer, the sub-
jects are Harvey Weinstein (four articles), Bill O’Reilly of Fox News (two articles), the comedian 
Louis C.K., the “power restaurateur” Ken Friedman, the “top-down ethos of male entitlement” at 
Vice Media, and the “lopsided” relationship between largely male venture capitalists and female 
entrepreneurs in the tech industry. Daniel Victor, The Times Just Won 3 Pulitzers. Read the Win-
ning Work, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/16/business/media/new-
york-times-pulitzers.html [https://perma.cc/5ANJ-83XF]; Emily Steel, At Vice, Cutting-Edge Me-
dia and Allegations of Old-School Sexual Harassment, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2017), https://www.ny-
times.com/2017/12/23/business/media/vice-sexual-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/XW4F-6Q2 
U]; Katie Brenner, Women in Tech Speak Frankly on Culture of Harassment, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/30/technology/women-entrepreneurs-speak-out-sexual-h 
arassment.html [https://perma.cc/A35G-NFC9]. One article that does not fit the pattern is Susan 
Chira and Catrin Einhorn’s powerful investigation of sexual harassment at two Chicago Ford 
plants. How Tough Is It to Change a Culture of Harassment? Ask Women at Ford, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/19/us/ford-chicago-sexual-harassment.ht 
ml [https://perma.cc/EZ8J-BWAR]. Alongside the stories of sexualized harassment told in that ar-
ticle are others about the non-sexualized harassment female workers faced by fellow (male) work-
ers who thought women “belonged at home in the kitchen.” Female workers were physically 
blocked from doing their jobs, had their tires slashed, and were denied bathroom breaks. Id.; cf. 
Brian Soucek, Queering Sexual Harassment Law, 128 YALE L.J. F. 67 (2018), https://www.yalelaw 
journal.org/forum/queering-sexual-harassment-law [https://perma.cc/DH8R-NPDL] (describing   
how harassment of women in largely male workplaces often takes both sexualized and non-sexu-
alized forms); Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 6. Notably, complaints 
against Ford, settled for over $10 million in August 2017, included both sexual and racial harass-
ment allegations. See Ford Motor Company to Pay up to $10.125 Million to Settle EEOC Harass-
ment Investigation, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.eeoc.gov 
/eeoc/newsroom/release/8-15-17.cfm [https://perma.cc/Q78Y-LGHZ]. 
 9 Audrey Carlsen et al., #MeToo Brought Down 201 Powerful Men. Nearly Half of Their Re-
placements Are Women, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/ 
23/us/metoo-replacements.html [https://perma.cc/98NM-FGUJ]. 
 10 See Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again, supra note 6, at 3132. 
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about sexual harassment, the Times adopted an official definition of 
sexual harassment that limits it to sexual conduct. In a section near the 
start, entitled “Agree on Definitions,” the country’s paper of record says: 
The Times defines sexual harassment in the workplace this way: 
‘Sexual harassment in the workplace is an umbrella term that 
encompasses a range of unwanted behaviors. This includes non-
physical harassment, including suggestive remarks and ges-
tures, or requests for sexual favors. Physical harassment in-
cludes touches, hugs, kisses and coerced sex acts.’11 
In a later section styled a note to teachers, the article clarifies: “The 
Times uses the terms ‘sexual harassment’ and ‘sexual misconduct’ to 
refer to a range of behaviors that are sexual in nature and nonconsen-
sual. The term ‘sexual assault’ usually signifies a felony sexual offense, 
like rape.”12 This is not the only time the New York Times has adopted 
a sexual definition of harassment. A November 10, 2017 New York 
Times article used the same definition.13 
The Times thus limits “sexual harassment” to nonconsensual be-
haviors “that are sexual in nature”14—not to all harassment “based on 
sex,” as the legal definition does. This limitation is all the more surpris-
ing because the Times supports it with a cite to the broader legal defi-
nition. The 2018 article sends those seeking “more information” to an 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) website on “Sex-
ual Harassment,” which broadly prohibits all harassment based on sex, 
regardless of whether it is sexual in nature.15 After noting in the first 
paragraph that harassment can include unwanted sexual conduct, the 
EEOC’s second paragraph explicitly provides: “Harassment does not 
 
 11 Natalie Proulx, Christopher Pepper & Katherine Schulten, The Reckoning: Teaching About 
the #MeToo Moment and Sexual Harassment with Resources from the New York Times, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/25/learning/lesson-plans/the-reckoning-teach-
ing-about-the-metoo-moment-and-sexual-harassment-with-resources-from-the-new-york-times.ht 
ml [https://perma.cc/NR78-UL5Y]. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Valeriya Safronoya, When You Experience Sexual Harassment at Work, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/10/style/sexual-harassment-work-advice-lawyers.ht 
ml [https:// perma.cc/5745-4NSM] (adopting the same narrow sexual definition in an earlier piece). 
 14 Proulx et al., supra note 11. 
 15 Id. (linking to Laws, Regulations and Guidance: Sexual Harassment, U.S. EQUAL 
OPPORTUNITY EMP. COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/sexual_harassment.cfm [https://per 
ma.cc/DJM7-69PW] (“It is unlawful to harass a person (an applicant or employee) because of that 
person’s sex.”). 
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have to be of a sexual nature, however, and can include offensive re-
marks about a person’s sex. For example, it is illegal to harass a woman 
by making offensive comments about women in general.”16 
Last year, we asked about the discrepancy between the Times’s def-
inition and the legal definition the Times itself references. A staff mem-
ber responded that, according to its Standards Editor, the Times “defers 
to the dictionary definition of sexual harassment.”17 “[W]e don’t see it 
as our role to define sexual harassment for the world,” she added.18 
There is an irony in the New York Times disclaiming any role in 
defining sexual harassment even as the paper itself publishes lesson 
plans that include (and promote) an official Times definition of sexual 
harassment. And there is some circularity in deferring to the dictionary 
definition of “sexual harassment” when descriptive dictionaries look to 
authoritative cultural sources like the Times when tracing such terms’ 
usage and meaning.19 
Whatever the Times might say, its definition and use of the term 
“sexual harassment” matters. And today’s almost unprecedented focus 
on sexual harassment by the Times, among other media sources, makes 
it crucial to ask, perhaps now more than ever, whether they are focused 
on the right thing. 
B. The Broader Definition 
Over twenty years ago, Vicki Schultz began challenging what was 
then—and in the New York Times, apparently still is—the prevailing 
view of sexual harassment. Schultz explained that, according to what 
she called the “sexual desire paradigm,” the quintessential case of har-
assment “involves a more powerful, typically older, male supervisor, 
who uses his superior organizational position to demand sexual favors 
from a less powerful, typically younger, female subordinate.”20 She doc-
umented the way this prevailing sexualized view of harassment had 
shaped, and adversely affected, legal and cultural responses. 
 
 16 Laws, Regulations and Guidance: Sexual Harassment, U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMP. 
COMM’N, supra note 15. 
 17 Email from Lara Takenaga, Reader Center, N.Y. TIMES, to Brian Soucek (May 14, 2018, 
09:17 EST) (on file with authors). 
 18 Id. 
 19 For example, the Oxford English Dictionary cites to a 2002 New York Times Magazine usage 
in its entry defining “quid pro quo.” Quid pro quo, Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed. 2007) (citing 
Margaret Talbot, Men Behaving Badly, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2002), (“A lot of workplace harassment 
consisted not of bluntly quid pro quo sexual solicitations . . . but of sexual jokes and vulgarity.”)) 
 20 Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 6, at 1692; see also id. (“This 
sexual desire-dominance paradigm governs our understanding of harassment. Its influence is re-
flected in the very fact that the category is referred to as ‘sexual’ harassment rather than, for 
example, ‘gender-based’ or ‘sex-based’ harassment.”). 
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Schultz offered a broader understanding of harassment as a means 
of undermining the competence, authority, and inclusion of women, and 
some “lesser” men, in favored, male-dominated jobs and spaces. Har-
assment of this sort serves to “reinforce gender difference and to claim 
work competence and authority as masculine preserves.”21 By driving 
away women and gender-nonconforming men, or labeling them as “dif-
ferent” and inferior, Schultz theorized, dominants could shore up their 
superior economic position, social status, and sense of masculine iden-
tity. On this conception, sexual harassment is both a consequence and 
further cause of sex-segregated or gender-unbalanced workplaces.22 
Schultz’s theory was one of the first to characterize sexual harass-
ment as primarily a means of policing gender boundaries, not securing 
sexual liaisons.23 In this new approach, law and policy should focus on 
eliminating gender hierarchies and discrimination, not on prohibiting 
sexuality per se. For this reason, the reconceptualized view defines sex-
ual harassment both more broadly and in some respects more narrowly 
than the traditional sexualized paradigm. “Sexual harassment,” recon-
ceptualized, includes derogatory comments and actions that are di-
rected at people because of their sex or gender but have no sexualized 
content; yet it does not extend to benign sexual remarks and actions 
that have no harmful gender-based motivations or effects, but which 
many employers are nonetheless often eager to ban.24 Trying to sup-
press all hints of sexuality risks reinforcing dominant but unacknowl-
edged sexual hierarchies, thus punishing people of color, lesbians and 
gay men, and others sterotyped as sexual deviants.25 
In the reconceptualized view, then, sexual harassment law should 
aim at gender hierarchy, not sexuality alone. But, of course, sexual be-
havior can be used to foster gender disadvantage. Schultz noted that, 
particularly in traditionally male-dominated settings, sexual assault 
and ridicule are often used as weapons to exaggerate women’s or gay 
men’s difference and reinforce the dominants’ superiority. She argued 
that “nonsexual forms of harassment frequently are accompanied by 
more sexual ones, such as crude sexual overtures, or sexual taunting 
 
 21 Id. at 1755, 1759. 
 22 See id. at 1760. 
 23 Id. at 1762 (describing harassment as “conduct that is rooted in gender-based expecta-
tions—not simply conduct that is sexual in nature”); see also Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong 
with Sexual Harassment, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691 (1997) (characterizing sexual harassment as a 
“technology of sexism”). 
 24 See Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061 (2003); see also Vicki 
Schultz, Open Statement on Sexual Harassment on Behalf of Employment Discrimination Law 
Scholars, STANFORD L. REV. ONLINE (2018), https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/open-state-
ment-on-sexual-harassment-from-employment-discrimination-law-scholars/ [https://perma.cc/9R 
F7-FFNU]. 
 25 Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 6, at 1729, 1784–85, 1789 n.540. 
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and mockery.”26 Sexual misconduct is often a telltale sign of a larger 
pattern of gender-based hostilities.27 
Writing two decades apart, each of us has described in disturbing 
and depressingly similar detail the varied ways both sexual and non-
sexual behaviors have been used to harass women in East Coast fire 
departments.28 Lawsuits against New York City and Providence, Rhode 
Island, revealed sexually crude comments, sexual advances, invasions 
of privacy, and sexual assaults that were inflicted by male firefighters 
on their female colleagues.29 But equally pervasive and pernicious were 
the non-sexualized ways in which men tried to undermine female fire-
fighters and drive them out of their departments. In New York City in 
the early 1980s, female firefighters were denied the training given to 
men and were then blamed for their lesser ability to perform the tasks 
for which they had been denied training. Equally humiliatingly, male 
firefighters deprived the women of meals, cooperation, and “the unique 
forms of communal living that are characteristic of the firefighters’ 
workplace.”30 In Providence, twenty years later, a lesbian lieutenant in 
the fire department was actually poisoned during the communal meals. 
More than one male subordinate flicked the pin signifying her rank and 
said they would never take an order from her. One man under her com-
mand so resented the lieutenant’s orders that he snapped off his rubber 
gloves in the back of a rescue vehicle, flinging a patient’s blood and 
brain matter onto his superior’s face.31 
All of this is sexual harassment. Regardless of whether the harass-
ment involved sexual advances or taunts, gender-specific slurs, or acts 
of hostility and exclusion, the antagonistic actions, assaults, ridicule, 
ostracism, marginalization, and sabotage these women endured all 
served the same aim: policing gender boundaries and preserving the 
gendered character of firefighting. All of this was done to shore up the 
men’s gendered—which is to say heterosexual and stereotypically mas-
culine—position, status, image, and sense of identity. 
 
 26 Id. at 1766. 
 27 See id. at 1755–62, 1764–66; see also Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again, 
supra note 6, at n.32 and accompanying text. 
 28 See Soucek, Queering Sexual Harassment, supra note 8; Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual 
Harassment, supra note 6, at 1769–73. 
 29 See Berkman v. City of New York, 580 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d, 755 F.2d 913 (2d 
Cir. 1985) (described in Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment Law, supra note 6, passim); 
see also Franchina v. City of Providence, 881 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2018) (described in Soucek, Queering 
Sexual Harassment, supra note 8, passim). 
 30 Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment Law, supra note 6, at 1771 (quoting Berk-
man v. City of New York, 580 F. Supp. at 232). 
 31 Soucek, Queering Sexual Harassment, supra note 8, at 71–72. 
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These women, these types of stories, are hardly unique. Research 
has repeatedly found that the most pervasive forms of workplace har-
assment are not sexual advances and attention, but rather non-sexual 
hostile or offensive behaviors directed at women (and gender-noncon-
forming men) because of their sex or gender performance.32 In light of 
these findings, today, many social scientists have moved away from the 
older sexual desire paradigm in favor of a broader gender-policing the-
ory like the one proposed by Schultz.33 In this view, harassment is more 
about gender-based put-downs than about sexual come-ons.34 Evidence 
suggests that unwanted sexual attention and advances typically do not 
occur in isolation, but instead co-occur with broader gender-based or 
other hostilities.35 Thus, even the come-ons often prove to be less about 
sexual desire than a desire to “devalue women or punish those who vi-
olate gender norms.”36 
Reviewing recent research, a 2016 report by an EEOC task force 
concluded that “sexist or crude/offensive behaviors” that are “devoid of 
 
 32 See Jennifer Berdahl & Jana L Raver, Sexual Harassment, 3 AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N 
HANDBOOK OF INDUS. & ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. 641, 646 (2011); EEOC REP., infra note 37 
(collecting recent studies). See also Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again, supra 
note 6, at 33–42 (discussing recent research and examples involving women); Brian Soucek, Per-
ceived Homosexuals: Looking Gay Enough for Title VII, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 715, 731–738, 744–760 
(2014); Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 6 (discussing early research 
and examples). 
 33 See George Akerlof & Rachel Kranton, Economics and Identity, 3 Q. J. ECON. 715, 733 & 
n.37 (2000); Jennifer L. Berdahl, Harassment Based on Sex: Protecting Social Status in the Context 
of Gender Hierarchy, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 641 (2007); Emily A. Leskinen, Lilia M. Cortina & 
Dana B. Kabat, Gender Harassment: Broadening Our Understanding of Sex-Based Harassment at 
Work, 35 J. L. & HUM. BEHAV. 25, 36 (2010); Sandy Welsh, Gender and Sexual Harassment, 25 
ANN. REV. SOC. 169, 175 (1999) (citing Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 
6, to acknowledge broader, nonsexual forms of harassment, and calling on social science research-
ers to take account of harassment that does not fit the “top-down, male-female sexual come-on 
image of harassment” paradigm). 
 34 See Emily A. Leskinen et al., Gender Harassment: Broadening Our Understanding of Sex-
Based Harassment at Work, supra note 33, at 36 (“Taken together, our empirical results support 
the legal theory that ‘much of the time, harassment assumes a form that has little or nothing to 
do with sexuality but everything to do with gender”‘) (citing Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual 
Harassment, supra note 6, at 1687). For the origin of the “put downs” versus “come ons” distinction, 
see Louise F. Fitzgerald, Michele J. Gelfand & Fritz Drasgow, Measuring Sexual Harassment: The-
oretical and Psychometric Advances, 17 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 425, 431–32 (1995) (“[I]t 
is sometimes difficult to determine whether a sexualized conversation is a come on or a put down 
(the essential distinction between unwanted sexual attention and gender harassment.”). 
 35 See, e.g., Berdahl & Raver, Sexual Harassment, supra note 32 (collecting studies showing 
that unwanted sexual attention and sexual coercion co-occurs with gender-based harassment, as 
well with other types of harassment); Sandy Lim & Lilia M. Cortina, Interpersonal Mistreatment 
in the Workplace: The Interface and Impact of General Incivility and Sexual Harassment, 90 J. 
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 483, 487, 490 (2005); see also Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., Measuring Sexual Har-
assment: Theoretical and Psychometric Advances, supra note 34, at 438. 
 36 Paula A. Johnson et al., Sexual Harassment of Women: Climate, Culture, and Consequences 
in Academic Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G, MED. 49 (2018) 
(hereinafter “NAT’L ACADS. REP.”). 
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sexual interest”37—behaviors the literature sometimes refers to as “gen-
der harassment’’38—are far more common than acts of unwanted sexual 
attention and sexual coercion.39 In surveys based on probability sam-
ples, the report notes, 25 percent of women say they have experienced 
“sexual harassment” at work,40 and 40 percent say they have experi-
enced one or more specific sexual behaviors.41 But in similar surveys 
asking about broader forms of gender-based hostility and harassment 
toward women, a much higher 60 percent of women report experiencing 
such harassment.42 The figures are even higher for some women in 
male-dominated settings. Large-scale studies of women working in the 
military and in law firms reported, for example, that nine in ten har-
assment victims had experienced sex-based or gender-harassment “in 
the absence of unwanted sexual attention or coercion.”43 
A 2018 report from the National Academies of Sciences, Engineer-
ing, and Medicine similarly found that “gender harassment ([defined 
as] behaviors that communicate that women do not belong or do not 
merit respect) is by far the most common type of sexual harassment.”44 
Indeed, according to this report, “unwanted sexual attention and sexual 
 
 37 Select Task Force on the Study of Harassment in the Workplace: Report of Co-Chairs Chai 
R. Feldblum & Victoria A. Lipnic, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (June 9, 2016), https:// 
www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_force/harassment/report.cfm#_Toc453686302 [https://perma.cc/Z2KP-77 
CZ] (hereinafter “EEOC REP.”). 
 38 Id. at 9. The widely used Sexual Experiences Questionnaire developed by psychologist 
Louise Fitzgerald and her colleagues coined the term “gender harassment” to refer to hostile or 
offensive behaviors conveying negative attitudes toward women but devoid of sexual interest. 
Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., The Incidence and Dimensions of Sexual Harassment in Academia and 
the Workplace, 32 J. VOC. BEHAV. 152, 157 (1988). Many social scientists have adopted this term, 
treating it as a subset of a larger body of sexual or sex-based harassment that includes gender 
harassment, sexual coercion, and unwanted sexual attention. See, e.g., Emily A. Leskinen et al., 
Gender Harassment: Broadening Our Understanding of Sex-Based Harassment at Work, supra 
note 33. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. at 8 & n.15. 
 41 Id. at 8 & n.16. 
 42 Id. at 8–9 & n.21. See also NAT’L ACADS. REP., supra note 44, at 31 (“[W]omen who experi-
ence the gender harassment type of sexual harassment are more than 7 times less likely to label 
their experiences as ‘sexual harassment’ than women who experience unwanted sexual attention 
or sexual coercion. This illustrates what other research has shown: that in both the law and the 
lay public, the dominant understandings of sexual harassment overemphasize two forms of sexual 
harassment, sexual coercion and unwanted sexual attention, while downplaying the third (most 
common) type—gender harassment.”). 
 43 Emily A. Leskinen et al., Gender Harassment: Broadening Our Understanding of Sex-Based 
Harassment at Work, supra note 33, at 36. 
 44 NAT’L ACADS. REP., supra note 36. 
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coercion are almost never experienced by women without simultane-
ously experiencing gender harassment.”45 Notably, gender harassment 
more commonly comes from peers than superiors.46 
Despite the greater prevalence of these non-sexual acts of sexism 
and hostility, many women do not understand them to be actionable 
sexual harassment. The public conversation that highlights sexual ad-
vances, while neglecting less salacious forms of sexism, undoubtedly 
limits employees’ understanding of what counts as sexual harassment. 
Disturbingly, the National Academies Report also found that: 
Women who experience the gender harassment type of sexual 
harassment are more than 7 times less likely to label their expe-
riences as ‘sexual harassment’ than women who experience un-
wanted sexual attention or sexual coercion. This illustrates what 
other research has shown: that in both the law and the lay pub-
lic, the dominant understandings of sexual harassment overem-
phasize two forms of sexual harassment, sexual coercion and un-
wanted sexual attention, while downplaying the third (most 
common) type—gender harassment.47 
The New York Times is surely a contributor to this limited lay un-
derstanding, given the paper’s narrow sexual definition and coverage. 
But the Times would not have to look far to broaden its horizons. Iron-
ically, the paper’s own recent survey of full-time male workers revealed 
a greater prevalence of sexual harassment that lacks sexual designs. In 
December 2017, the Times asked 615 men whether they had engaged 
in any sort of sexist “objectionable behavior or sexual harassment” at 
work during the previous year.48 Of the ten behaviors listed in the sur-
vey, the two that are most consistent with what the literature terms 
“gender harassment” received the highest responses. One—“[t]old sex-
ual stories or jokes that some might consider offensive”—got the highest 
response, at 19%. The second highest response came from the 16% of 
men who admitted to making “remarks that some might consider sexist 
or offensive.” The options more clearly involving sexual advances, as-
saults, or coercion—those involving dates, sexual discussions, gestures 
or body language “of a sexual nature,” uncomfortable touching, unin-
vited fondling or kissing, and sexual quid pro quo offers—all received 
 
 45 Id. at 171. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 31. 
 48 Jugal K. Patel, Troy Griggs & Claire Cain Miller, We Asked 615 Men About How They Con-
duct Themselves at Work, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12 
/28/upshot/sexual-harassment-survey-600-men.html [https://perma.cc/BS2Z-M5YS]. 
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lower responses in the range of one to four percent.49 According to the 
Times’s official definition, however, the sexist and offensive remarks to 
which more men admitted would count only as objectionable behavior—
not sexual harassment. 
C.  The Law’s Definition 
The law prohibits all harassment based on sex, regardless of 
whether it is sexual in motivation or means. Authoritative judicial de-
cisions have made this clear for twenty years. Writing for the Supreme 
Court in 1998, Justice Scalia emphasized both that “harassing conduct 
need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of dis-
crimination on the basis of sex,”50 and that workplace behavior is not 
“automatically discrimination because of sex merely because the words 
used have sexual content or connotations.”51 What matters, the Court 
said in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, is not the sexualized 
nature of certain words or actions, but the way words and actions affect 
working conditions for some people because of their sex or gender.52 On-
cale and other decisions clarify that sexual harassment is actionable 
whenever it amounts to sex discrimination in the terms and conditions 
of employment—not under some special offshoot of Title VII that per-
tains specifically to sexual conduct. 
U.S. law did not always take this clear stance. Feminist scholars 
and lawyers had to fight for judicial recognition of non-sexual but still 
sex-based forms of sexual harassment.53 Since Oncale, however, nearly 
all the federal courts of appeals have similarly clarified that “sexual 
harassment” encompasses actions that are, in the Seventh Circuit’s 
words, “sexist rather than sexual.”54 Increasingly—and crucially for 
claims brought by LGBT workers—the courts of appeals have also 
 
 49 Id. 
 50 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. Oncale also clarified that same-sex sexual harassment is fully actionable under Title 
VII, regardless of the sexual orientation of the harasser. 
 53 See Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 6, at nn.81, 82; Schultz, Re-
conceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again, supra note 6, at nn.194–199, and accompanying text. 
 54 Boumehdi v. Plastag Holdings, LLC, 489 F. 3d 781, 788 (7th Cir. 2007). See also O’Rourke 
v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 730 & n.5 (1st Cir. 2001); Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 
F.3d 141, 154–55 (2d Cir. 2000); Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 149 (3d Cir. 1999); 
Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 335 F.3d 325, 327 (4th Cir. 2003); Beard v. Southern Flying J, 
Inc., 266 F.3d 792 (8th Cir. 2001); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001); 
Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 565 (6th Cir. 1999). But see Rene v. MGM Grand 
Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1069 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2002) (relying on fact that the alleged misconduct 
was sexual in nature to hold same-sex harassment actionable). The D.C. Circuit was the first to 
hold that actionable harassment need not be sexual in nature, see McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 
1129, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1985), but the decision was widely ignored, as Schultz demonstrated. Recon-
ceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 6, at 1732–38. 
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acknowledged in recent years that workers harassed for deviating from 
gender-based stereotypes and expectations have an actionable sexual 
harassment claim under Title VII.55 These cases show the continuity 
between claims rooted in gender stereotyping and those sounding in 
sexual orientation or gender identity.56 LGBT employees who are har-
assed because of their partners’ sex or gender or their display of gender-
atypical interests or clothing,57 like women who dare to invade fields 
dominated by men,58 or men who openly use wet wipes on a construction 
site59—all face hostility because they have violated their employers’ or 
coworkers’ views of how “real” men and women should behave.60 They 
have run afoul of the gender police at work. Protecting them from such 
gender policing, at least when it becomes severe or pervasive, is among 
Title VII’s aims—as most courts now recognize.61 This is true regardless 
of whether the harassment is predominantly “sexual.” 
Despite the formal judicial consensus on this question, however, 
some confusion over whether sexual harassment refers only to sexual 
conduct still appears in certain public pronouncements by the EEOC 
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), the two leading agencies charged 
with enforcing federal employment discrimination law. 
 
 55 Soucek, Perceived Homosexuals: Looking Gay Enough for Title VI, supra note 32, at 748–
760. 
 56 See Brief of Anti-Discrimination Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of the Employees, 
Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., No. 17-1618 (U.S., July 3, 2019), at 8–16; Soucek, Queering Sexual 
Harassment Law, supra note 8, at 72–75. But see Brief of U.S. as Amicus Curiae, Zarda v. Altitude 
Express, Inc., No. 15-3775 (2d Cir. Jul. 26, 2017) (ECF No. 281) (arguing that a gay plaintiff’s Title 
VII discrimination claim is impermissibly based on his sexual orientation, rather than his sex); 
Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 154 (2d Cir. 2018), (Lynch, J., dissenting) (acknowl-
edging the government’s amicus argument, and concluding similarly), cert. granted, 2019 WL 
1756678 (2019) (consolidated with Bostock v. Clayton Cnty. Ga., cert granted, 2019 WL 1756677 
(2019)); Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 361 (7th Cir. 2017) (Sykes, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is not discrimination 
“because of sex” under Title VII); Evans v. Georgia Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1254–5 (11th Cir. 
2017) (“[T]he lower court erred because a gender non-conformity claim is not ‘just another way to 
claim discrimination based on sexual orientation,’ but instead, constitutes a separate, distinct av-
enue for relief under Title VII.”) 
 57 Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 759 (6th Cir. 2006) (where plaintiff’s friendship 
with a gay man sparked harassment); Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 287 (3d Cir. 
2009) (where plaintiff’s “effeminate” style of dress and mannerisms made him a target for harass-
ment). See also Soucek, Perceived Homosexuals:, supra note 32; Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual 
Harassment, supra note 6, at 1777–89. 
 58 Franchina v. City of Providence, 881 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2018); Soucek, Queering Sexual Har-
assment Law, supra note 8, at 75. 
 59 EEOC. v. Boh Bros. Const. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 450 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 60 See Brian Soucek, Hively’s Self-Induced Blindness, 127 YALE L.J. F. 115, 123 (2017), 
https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/hivelys-self-induced-blindness [https://perma.cc/6D8Z-7C3 
6]. 
 61 Supra notes 54–56. 
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A search for “sexual harassment” on the EEOC’s website points in 
different directions. A page on “Types of Discrimination”62 links to an 
excellent page titled simply “Harassment.”63 Commendably, the latter 
page treats harassment as something that can be based on sex, race, 
religion, or any of the other protected categories; all are treated as 
equivalent. As a result, the examples given are, by necessity, not sexu-
alized; they include “offensive jokes, slurs, . . . physical assaults or 
threats, intimidation, ridicule . . . , insults or put-downs, offensive ob-
jects or pictures, and interference with work performance.”64 Further, 
the website makes clear that harassment need not be top-down. Har-
assers can be co-workers or even non-employees, too. 
By contrast, the EEOC devotes a separate link on the “Types of 
Discrimination” page to a page on “Sexual Harassment”—the site to 
which the Times linked in its lesson plan.65 That page makes clear that 
harassment may include but “does not need to be of a sexual nature,” 
as discussed above. Yet, it confusingly also seems to limit “sexual har-
assment” to sexualized conduct, stating that “[h]arassment can include 
‘sexual harassment’ or unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual 
favors, and other verbal or physical harassment of a sexual nature.”66 
Put in quotes and defined in overtly sexualized terms, “sexual harass-
ment” is presented as a subset of the sex-based harassment that is the 
subject of the page as a whole. Worse, links on the side direct readers 
to pages offering “Facts about Sexual Harassment,”67 a March 1990 
“Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment,”68 and the 
Code of Federal Regulations section on sexual harassment.69 All three 
use now-obsolete language from 1980 that says: “Unwelcome sexual ad-
vances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct 
of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment. . . . ”70 
 
 62 Discrimination by Type, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (last visited Jan. 20, 2019), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/ [https://perma.cc/RC28-DC5M]. 
 63 Harassment, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (last visited Mar. 8, 2019), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/harassment.cfm [https://perma.cc/PTP8-MM6R]. 
 64 Id. 
 65 See Sexual Harassment, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (last visited Jan. 20, 
2019), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/sexual_harassment.cfm [https://perma.cc/8SNB-9LA9]. 
 66 Id. (emphasis added). 
 67 Id. (linking to Facts About Sexual Harassment, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N 
(last visited Jan. 20, 2019), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/fs-sex.cfm [https://perma.cc/8J 
HR-WG4W]). 
 68 Id. (linking to EEOC-N-915-050 Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment, 
U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n (Mar. 19, 1990), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/currentis-
sues.html [https://perma.cc/8ZLA-MEZC]). 
 69 See Sexual Harassment, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2018). 
 70 Id. § 1604.11(a). 
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This narrow description comes from the EEOC’s 1980 Guidelines 
on Discrimination Because of Sex,71 which codified the sexualized defi-
nition that some feminist theorists, and eventually most courts, reacted 
against in the following two decades. The law has since moved on, but 
the original guideline and the Code of Federal Regulations remains un-
changed. The EEOC has not updated either, but only issued policy pro-
nouncements reflecting the broader understanding. In a Policy Guid-
ance released in March 1990, for example, the agency took note of a 
1985 D.C. Circuit decision and acknowledged that “[a]lthough the 
Guidelines specifically address conduct that is sexual in nature, sex-
based harassment—that is, harassment not involving sexual activity or 
language—may also give rise to Title VII liability.”72 
This lack of clarity creates an opening that those who wish to re-
turn to the older, sexualized definition of harassment can exploit. In-
deed, it is the language of the 1980 Guidelines that officials and man-
agers often import into policy statements. Take, for example, the DOJ’s 
latest memorandum on sexual harassment, released in April 2018 after 
an internal investigation by the DOJ’s Inspector General led to a de-
partment-wide working group, convened to address the problem.73 Not 
only does DOJ’s memo adhere to the 1980 Guidelines in defining sexual 
harassment as “unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, 
and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature,”74 it goes on to 
illustrate the targeted misconduct though a series of exclusively sexu-
alized examples, which include: “displaying ‘pinup’ calendars or sex-
ually demeaning pictures, telling sexually oriented jokes, making sex-
ually offensive remarks, engaging in unwanted sexual teasing, 
subjecting another employee to pressure for dates, sexual advances, or 
unwelcome touching.”75 The DOJ’s important, newly implemented re-
porting and tracking procedures thus get triggered only by actions that 
fit the now obsolete, sexualized conception of sexual harassment. 
 
 71 Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 45 Fed. Reg. 74, 677 (Nov. 10, 1980) (codified 
at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11) (“Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal 
or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment . . . ”). 
 72 EEOC-N-915-050, supra note 68, at § C.4. 
 73 Rod Rosenstein, Memorandum on Sexual Harassment and Sexual Misconduct (Apr. 30, 
2018), https://www.justice.gov/jmd/page/file/1059401/download [https://perma.cc/7H2Y-KADG]. 
See also Katie Benner, Justice Department Releases New Sexual Harassment Guidelines, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/03/us/politics/justice-department-sexual-
harassment.html [https://perma.cc/7788-CKUP]. 
 74 Id. In fact, the DOJ goes further than the 1980 Guidelines in sexualizing “sexual harass-
ment”: where the Guidelines said verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature et cetera constitute 
sexual harassment—at least leaving open the possibility that other non-sexualized activity might 
also constitute sexual harassment—the DOJ says that “sexual harassment” refers to verbal or 
physical conduct of a sexual nature (et cetera). 
 75 Id.; see also Prevention of Harassment in the Workplace, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY 
COMM’N (last visited Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/jmd/eeos/sexual-harassment [https://p 
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Notably, the definition of “sexual harassment” in these internal 
policies that the DOJ applies to its own employees is narrower than the 
definition the agency uses in litigation efforts on behalf of employees 
generally. DOJ’s Civil Rights Division recently launched a major initi-
ative against “Sexual Harassment in the Workplace,” focusing on public 
sector employers.76 The initiative began with a lawsuit against the Hou-
ston Fire Department, alleging that male firefighters had engaged in 
hostile work environment harassment by directing brutal insults, 
threats, pranks, property damage, and sabotage—but no sexual ad-
vances—against the only two female firefighters at Houston’s Station 
54.77 The men made the made the workplace hellish for the two women 
who dared to enter their domain.78 Though no sexual activity was in-
volved, the harassment was surely based on sex. The federal courts 
should have no difficulty condemning their behavior as unlawful sexual 
harassment; they have long done so in other cases, as discussed above.79 
But fact patterns like these would not qualify as sexual harassment un-
der the DOJ’s own new internal policies, under the EEOC’s old 1980 
guideline, or under language on some of the governmental websites 
meant to instruct the public on the meaning of sexual harassment. 
There is, in sum, a split in the way sexual harassment is defined 
and understood. On one side is a broad gender-based conception re-
flected in federal caselaw and the extensive social science documenting 
the varied forms of workplace harassment experienced by both women 
and men, especially those who deviate from dominant gender stereo-
types. On the other side is the exclusively sexualized, implicitly male-
to-female notion of sexual harassment offered by the 1980 EEOC Guide-
lines, the DOJ’s internal policy, and the New York Times. 
 
erma.cc/3EFM-KLKL]. The examples are derived from a June 1993 memorandum from then-At-
torney General Janet Reno on the “Prevention of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace.” Memo-
randum to Dep’t of Just. Emps. (June 29, 1993). A follow-up memo released after Oncale noted 
that DOJ had reviewed that case and found its policies “consistent” with it. Janet Reno, Memoran-
dum on the Prevention of Sexual Harassment (Dec. 14, 1998). 
 76 Justice Department Launches Initiative to Fight Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-launches-ini-
tiative-fight-sexual-harassment-workplace [https://perma.cc/5GSZ-XEEJ]. 
 77 U.S. v. City of Houston, No. 4:18-cv-00644 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 28, 2018) (ECF No. 1), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1040081/download [https://perma.cc/5JQ8-JDGN]. 
 78 Id. at 3–14. 
 79 Numerous courts have condemned similar patterns of behavior as hostile work environment 
harassment that violates Title VII, as discussed above. See supra note 29 and accompanying text; 
see also supra note 54. 
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II.   WHY THE DEFINITION MATTERS 
It matters which conception of sexual harassment the New York 
Times and other media adopt—especially now, as the #MeToo move-
ment itself teeters between the two conceptions. The movement’s name 
derives from an earlier effort to combat sexual abuse.80 Its resurgence 
was spawned by a tweet that gave voice to millions who have been “sex-
ually harassed or assaulted.”81 Yet, after the initial emphasis on sexu-
alized harms, the movement began to focus attention on wider forms of 
workplace sexism. For example, #MeToo activists helped create “Time’s 
Up,” an initiative designed to address “the systemic inequality and in-
justice in the workplace that have kept underrepresented groups from 
reaching their full potential.”82 And some prominent supporters urged 
a broad gender lens for analyzing sexual violations, in line with the re-
conceived view of harassment.83 Thus, #MeToo encompasses both the 
older sexual desire paradigm that emphasizes male-to-female sexual 
misconduct predation as the quintessential problem and the recon-
ceived view that focuses more broadly on gender-based harassment and 
discrimination against women, LGBT people, and others who challenge 
gender norms. 
The question is which version will—or more importantly, should— 
capture the public imagination going forward. Are there good reasons 
for re-embracing the older sexualized view in the current era? 
To answer this question, we first speculate on why the New York 
Times might have adopted an exclusively sexual definition and view of 
harassment. The point is not to figure out the Times’s actual motiva-
 
 80 See Sandra E. Garcia, The Woman Who Created #MeToo Long Before Hashtags, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/20/us/me-too-movement-tarana-burke.html [htt 
ps://perma.cc/ULT8-MD4J] (describing activist Tarana Burke’s efforts to create the #MeToo cam-
paign). 
 81 “Me too. Suggested by a friend: ‘If all the women who have been sexually harassed or as-
saulted wrote ‘Me too.’ as a status, we might give people a sense of the magnitude of the problem.” 
Alyssa Milano (@Alyssa_Milano), TWITTER (Oct. 15, 2017, 3:21 PM), https://twitter.com/Alyssa_Mi-
lano/status/919659438700670976/photo/1?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetebed%7Ct 
wterm%5E919659438700670976&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ntimes.com%2F2017%2F10% 
2F20%2Fus%2Fme-too-movement-tarana-burke.html [https://perma.cc/48KW-BP22] (emphasis  
added). 
 82 About TIME’S Up, TIME’S UP, https://www.timesupnow.com/about_times_up [https://perma 
.cc/B49D-C4K2] (last visited Feb. 1, 2019). For discussion of similar reform efforts generated by 
#MeToo, see Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again, supra note 6, at 61. 
 83 Melissa Gira Grant, The Unsexy Truth About Harassment, N.Y. REV. BOOKS DAILY (Dec. 8, 
2017), http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2017/12/08/the-unsexy-truth-about-harassment [https://per 
ma.cc/FN8U-86LZ]; Anna North, What I’ve Learned Covering Sexual Misconduct This Year, VOX 
(Dec. 27, 2017), https://www.vox.com/identities/2017/12/27/16803610/sexual-misconduct-harass-
ment-reckoning-metoo [https://perma.cc/2DKA-2P7N]; Rebecca Traister, This Moment Isn’t (Just) 
About Sex. It’s Really About Work, CUT (Dec. 10, 2017), https://www.thecut.com/2017/12/rebecca-
traister-this-moment-isnt-just-about-sex.html [https://perma.cc/FEC9-GPRH]. 
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tions, but rather to ask why any responsible media outlet that is appar-
ently committed to exposing workplace harms against women would 
adopt such a view. We then discuss some of the harms of the sexualized 
view. 
A.  Reasons for Adopting a Sexual Definition 
1. Publicity. Perhaps part of the answer has to do with the fact that 
salacious stories generate publicity. Sex sells.84 Stories like those told 
about movie mogul Harvey Weinstein are the stuff of tabloids. Sear-
ingly personal, and painful as they are to read, the revelations made by 
actors such as Ashley Judd,85 Gwyneth Paltrow,86 Salma Hayek,87 and 
Lupita Nyong’o88 are also stories of sex, stars, and movie deals, set in 
exotic locations from Hollywood to Cannes. These stories are destined 
to find a wide audience that similarly disturbing descriptions of harass-
ment on Ford’s factory line89 likely never will.90 
2. Effectiveness. A more charitable explanation may lie in a belief 
that reporting on the wrongs committed by powerful figures like Harvey 
Weinstein, Matt Lauer,91 and Louis C.K.,92 can lead to greater change 
than stories about more entrenched cultures of harassment, often car-
ried out by coworkers or subordinates. After all, Harvey Weinstein’s 
sexual demands and assaults stopped when the New York Times ex-
posed them.93 The top-down, sexualized paradigm of harassment allows 
 
 84 See Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 6, at 1693–96 (describing 
outsize media focus on the sexualized details of harassment cases). 
 85 Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey, Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual Harassment Accusers for 
Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2xVPfVW [https://perma.cc/3Y4H-GFTB]. 
 86 Jodi Kantor & Rachel Abrams, Gwyneth Paltrow, Angelina Jolie and Others Say Weinstein 
Harassed Them, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2gapaOJ [https://perma.cc/4BJ8-
22L3]. 
 87 Salma Hayek, Harvey Weinstein Is My Monster, Too, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2017), 
https://nyti.ms/2nXntXL [https://perma.cc/F346-E68T]. 
 88 Lupita Nyong’o, Speaking Out About Harvey Weinstein, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2017), 
https://nyti.ms/2l0MXCm [https://perma.cc/AL2F-X28N]. 
 89 Chira & Einhorn, How Tough Is It to Change a Culture of Harassment? Ask Women at Ford, 
supra note 7. 
 90 Maggie Adams, Ari Isaacman Bevacqua & Anna Dubenko, The Most-Read New York Times 
Stories of 2017, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2BNssfH [https://perma.cc/9H74-J2GH] 
(noting that the stories cited in the previous four footnotes were, respectively, the 10th, 45th, 9th, 
and 80th most-read New York Times stories in 2017). 
 91 Ellen Gabler et al., NBC Fires Matt Lauer, the Face of ‘Today’, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017), 
https://nyti.ms/2k93ZOw [https://perma.cc/C8D8-VR8W] (this was the 7th most read New York 
Times article of 2017, Adams, Bevacqua & Dubenko, supra note 90). 
 92 Melena Ryzik, Cara Buckley & Jodi Kantor, Louis C.K. Is Accused by 5 Women of Sexual 
Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2ho0aE0 [https://perma.cc/S3E2-CXA6] 
(this was the 16th most read New York Times article of 2017, Adams, Bevacqua & Dubenko, supra 
note 90). 
 93 Supra notes 85–88. 
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for this kind of immediate, dramatic resolution: the guy at the top gets 
fired (an event which is often itself an important news story that gen-
erates more publicity). 
Collecting such stories, the Times’s infographic about the “201 Pow-
erful Men” brought down by #MeToo in its first year94 stands as a sym-
bol of the movement’s—and reporters’—effectiveness. A similar follow-
up to the Times’s reporting about the sexually and racially hostile work 
environment at Ford plants is harder to imagine. Indeed, the 2017 re-
porting on Ford was itself a follow-up to stories (and lawsuits) that 
emerged from the same Chicago-area plants in the 1990s.95 De-
pressingly little had changed in twenty years. The problem could not be 
fixed with a single well-publicized personnel change. 
But it remains to be seen whether the harassment problems in in-
dustries such as Hollywood and Silicon Valley can be fixed by firing in-
dividual harassers. In industries and workplaces plagued by harass-
ment, deeper structural problems, such as entrenched sex segregation, 
unchecked supervisory authority, and informal “who-you-know” hiring, 
give dominants the upper hand.96 As Schultz wrote recently after sur-
veying these entrenched problems in both industries: “Sooner or later, 
other harassers will take their place—unless the underlying conditions 
that foster harassment in the first place are addressed.”97 In other 
words, focusing on the traditional, sexualized, male boss/female subor-
dinate(s) vision of sexual harassment may not end up being as effective 
in the long run as it is dramatic in the short term. 
3. Pervasiveness or Seriousness. Perhaps, however, the Times and 
other media focus on workplace sexual abuse out of a belief that that it 
is more pervasive, or its harms more serious, than other types of sexist 
misconduct. Such a view has long been promoted by some strands of 
feminism.98 Early in the development of sexual harassment law, for ex-
ample, some feminists argued that “harassment is problematic pre-
cisely because it is sexual in nature—and because heterosexual sexu
 al relations are the primary mechanism through which male 
dominance and female subordination are maintained.”99 Early sexual 
 
 94 Audrey Carlsen et al., #MeToo Brought Down 201 Powerful Men. Nearly Half of Their Re-
placements Are Women, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/ 
23/us/metoo-replacements.html [https://perma.cc/4C3D-Z4KA]. 
 95 U.S. and Ford Settle Harassment Case, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 1999), https://nyti.ms/2IYFTgw 
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harassment cases challenged “precisely the sort of top-down, supervi-
sor-subordinate, male-female sexual extortion” decried by these femi-
nists.”100 
Some journalists may simply take this point of view for granted, 
but this is not the only feminist perspective on sexual harassment law. 
Members of the media should educate themselves and the public about 
the rich variety of feminist and progressive thought on the subject. 
Many writers reject the notion that sexuality is uniquely harmful, or 
that heterosexuality itself somehow generates harmful structures of 
gender, race, class, and homophobia in the workplace and other social 
realms.101 
Theoretical debate aside, it turns out that some key factual as-
sumptions used to defend the sexualized view of harassment are not 
well grounded. We discuss some of these inaccuracies, and associated 
harms, below. 
B. Counterarguments: The Harms of a Sexualized Definition. 
1. Pervasiveness. First of all, it is simply wrong to think that sexu-
alized forms of harassment are more pervasive than the types of sexual 
harassment sometimes referred to as “gender harassment.” (More on 
this term in Part III.) To the contrary, non-sexual, sex-based harass-
ment is far more common than sexual advances and attention, as dis-
cussed above.102 Defining it out of existence vastly underestimates the 
amount of harassment and discrimination facing working women, and 
many men, and leaves them ill-informed about their rights. 
2. Harmfulness. There is little if any evidence that overtly sexual 
harassment is more harmful than other forms. To the contrary, re-
search suggests that non-sexual harassment causes harm similar to 
that caused by more sexual forms.103 Indeed, in the workplace, the for-
mer may be even more harmful, precisely because it is not widely 
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acknowledged as a social problem. Thus, “unlike with overtly sexual 
harassment, women and other victims may also be more likely to inter-
nalize and blame themselves for nonsexual harassment, rather than at-
tributing it to sexism and gender bias for which they are not responsi-
ble.”104 
3. Skewed Focus. Focusing solely on sexualized forms of harass-
ment not only underestimates the incidence and harm of sexual harass-
ment generally: it also disproportionately neglects the types most often 
faced by women in supervisory positions and male-dominated job set-
tings,105 and by LGBT workers.106 According to the National Academies’ 
study, LBGT employees working in higher education report experienc-
ing “gender harassment” at two-and-a-half times the rate reported by 
heterosexual employees.107 These are people who by definition are cross-
ing traditional gender boundaries about their “proper place” or defying 
gender stereotypes about how proper “women” and “men” should be-
have. Harassment is a way of punishing them for gender non-conform-
ity.108 
Indeed, neglecting non-sexualized harassment and ignoring har-
assment against people who violate gender norms are dynamics that 
reinforce each other in a self-perpetuating cycle. Focusing only on New 
York Times-type stories in which a powerful heterosexual man makes 
sexual advances on the beautiful women who work for him makes a de-
sire-based account of sexual harassment all too easy to accept. After all, 
readers may think, what man wouldn’t want these women? Fore-
grounding less visible stories in which the person harassed is not a 
beautiful ingenue but a butch lesbian, harassed because she is the 
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boss,109 makes it easier to see something other than sexual interest and 
opportunism as harassment’s cause.110 
At the same time, rooting sexual harassment in sexual desire ra-
ther than gender policing makes it much more difficult to see the har-
assment of LGBT and other gender non-conforming people as a form of 
sex discrimination.111 By focusing only on sexual desire, we miss the 
common thread linking a male boss’s sexual advances, a co-worker’s ho-
mophobic slurs, and the insubordination faced by a female authority 
figure from the men who work for her: All are attempts to police gender 
and reinforce gendered spaces, professions, and prerogatives. Disrupt-
ing such gender boundaries has always been part of the contested 
meaning of Title VII.112 
4. Misunderstood Motivations. This last observation suggests an-
other cost of ignoring non-sexualized forms and causes of sexual har-
assment: Doing so can lead observers to misunderstand and downplay 
even the sexualized forms.113 
Consider, for example, one of Donald Trump’s standard defenses 
against allegations of predatory sexual advances and assaults: “She’s 
not my type.”114 Or, as his then-lawyer Michael Cohen said of the accus-
ers, “they’re not somebody that he would be attracted to, and therefore, 
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the whole thing is nonsense.”115 This defense only makes sense if mis-
placed sexual desire is the sole reason men sexually harass women. But 
it is not. Unwanted sexual advances can also serve to maintain mascu-
line status in the eyes of other men—not just by carrying them out, but 
also, often, by boasting about them, lording them over other men, or 
using them as a means of bonding.116 
This point helps explain a crucial but unappreciated moment in the 
recent confirmation hearings of now-Justice Brett Kavanaugh. Senator 
Patrick Leahy asked Dr. Christine Blasey Ford about her strongest 
memory from the day she was attacked. Her answer is now famous: 
FORD: Indelible in the hippocampus is the laughter, the laugh—
the uproarious laughter between the two, and their having fun 
at my expense. 
Senator Leahy continued: 
LEAHY: You’ve never forgotten that laughter. You’ve never for-
gotten them laughing at you. 
FORD: They were laughing with each other. 
LEAHY: And you were the object of the laughter? 
FORD: I was, you know, underneath one of them while the two 
laughed, two friend[s]—two friends having a really good time 
with one another.117 
Despite his sympathetic questioning, Senator Leahy was unable to 
see what Dr. Ford instantly realized. The laughter was not at her or 
about her, just as the attack she described was not about sexual grati-
fication. Before all else, the whole thing was a form of homosocial bond-
ing: two privileged boys from an all-male school showing off for each 
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other, abusing alcohol and a young woman in order to “hav[e] a really 
good time.”118 
Dr. Ford’s insight into what she endured helps explain the rele-
vance of other stories told about Brett Kavanaugh around the same 
time—ones typically dismissed as irrelevant because they did not in-
volve sexual misconduct. The stories of aggression and blackout-level 
drinking at his all-male high school and his notorious all-male frater-
nity at Yale College all fit the pattern.119 They illustrate the antics men 
often use to compete, bond, and prove themselves to each other, espe-
cially in sex-segregated settings. These stories in no way contradict the 
counternarrative of ambition and success that Kavanaugh himself told. 
Instead, demonstrative masculinity—the beer and sports and yearbook 
jokes about girls—provided the path to success in the single-sex envi-
ronments where Kavanaugh thrived.120 
Thus, any alleged misconduct by Kavanaugh toward Dr. Ford was 
in service of his social ambition among other young men, not just teen-
age lust. Kavanaugh distanced himself from the latter explanation, per-
haps truthfully, claiming that he remained a virgin until well after col-
lege.121 But he doubled down on his embrace of the male-dominated 
institutions where he came of age. Focusing on solely his sexual inten-
tions obscures just how aggressively gendered those institutions were 
and are. To deny sexual intent is not to deny sexual harassment. Even 
sexual misconduct and assault can be motivated by things other than, 
or in addition to, a desire for sexual contact. 
The selective focus of Kavanaugh’s denials at the hearings was mir-
rored in written answers to questions Senator Chris Coons asked about 
another important homosocial relationship in Kavanaugh’s life: his 
clerkship and later friendship with Alex Kozinski, former judge on the 
Ninth Circuit. When asked whether he had ever witnessed Kozinski be-
having badly toward a law clerk, Kavanaugh understood each question 
and framed each answer to refer only to conduct of a sexual nature.122 
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Asked whether he had ever witnessed Kozinaki “engaging in inappro-
priate behavior,” for example, Kavanaugh replied, “Judge Kozinski was 
known to be a tough boss, but I did not witness him engaging in inap-
propriate behavior of a sexual nature.”123 
COONS: Did you ever see Judge Kozinski mistreat a law clerk 
or law clerk candidate? Please explain any such incident(s). 
KAVANAUGH: Over the course of my relationship with Judge 
Kozinski, I never saw him sexually harass a law clerk or law 
clerk candidate. 
COONS: Did Judge Kozinski ever use demeaning language 
when discussing women? 
KAVANAUGH: I do not remember hearing Judge Kozinski use 
demeaning language of a sexual nature when discussing women. 
COONS: Did anyone ever raise concerns with you about Judge 
Kozinski’s behavior? Who? When? 
KAVANAUGH: To the best of my memory, no one ever raised 
concerns with me regarding inappropriate behavior of a sexual 
nature on the part of Judge Kozinski.124 
Even assuming that Kavanaugh never observed any sexualized be-
havior by Kozinski, as others claim to have done,125 Kavanaugh’s an-
swers are still remarkably unresponsive.126 They evade the questions 
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by reducing all mistreatment to sexual harassment, and all sexual har-
assment to language and behavior “of a sexual nature.” 
Yet, a superior or peer can demean women, mistreat them, under-
mine their work or reputations, and even drive them from a workplace, 
job, or social space through harassing conduct and language not “of a 
sexual nature.” To leave this kind of harassment or motive out of the 
discussion is to ignore a major part of the sexual harassment clerks like 
Kozinski’s have said they endured. Indeed, it is to misunderstand the 
broader underlying harms of even the sexualized forms of harassment. 
Furthermore, it minimizes the problem of sexual harassment by limit-
ing it to a few sex-crazed bad apples. 
In the wake of the Kozinski scandal, a working group appointed by 
Chief Justice Roberts to help “protect all court employees from inappro-
priate conduct in the workplace,” largely avoided this trap. The group’s 
June 2018 report focused on harassment in all its forms, with the goal 
of promoting “an inclusive and respectful workplace.”127 It recom-
mended that the Judicial Conference issue clearer proscriptions on sex-
based harassment, including harassment based on sexual orientation 
and gender identity,128 and similarly clarify its Model Employment Dis-
pute Resolution Plan.129 Commentary to subsequently enacted amend-
ments to the Judicial Code of Conduct make clear that “harassment en-
compasses a range of conduct having no legitimate role in the 
workplace, including harassment that constitutes discrimination on im-
permissible grounds and other abusive, oppressive, or inappropriate 
conduct.”130 
Yet even in this admirable report and the reforms it spurred, the 
sexualized conception of sexual harassment retains a foothold. Amend-
ments to the Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability Pro-
ceedings enacted in March 2019 identify and address “unwanted, offen-
sive, or abusive sexual conduct, including sexual harassment or 
assault” separately from what Rules refer to as “intentional discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, sex, gender, gender identity, pregnancy, sexual 
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orientation, religion, national origin, age, or disability.”131 The concern 
here is that decision makers might limit sex- or gender-based “discrim-
ination” to tangible employment decisions, while limiting broader con-
cerns about hostile workplaces to complaints about “sexual conduct.” 
Such a process of disaggregation would limit responsibility for both, and 
allow non-sexual but still sex-based harassment to evade scrutiny alto-
gether. 132 
III.   WHY THE NAME MATTERS 
Even if we all agreed that non-sexual but still gendered forms of 
harassment are harmful and should be eliminated, the question re-
mains: What is at stake in calling them “sexual harassment”? Must we 
insist on reconceptualizing the very term “sexual harassment,” instead 
of replacing it with another overarching term that includes both sexual 
and non-sexual misconduct—perhaps “sex-based harassment,” as some 
have proposed?133 Or alternatively, could we preserve the sexualized 
definition of “sexual harassment” but add to it another term, such as 
“gender harassment,” to capture all the sexism and abuse that the sex-
ualized notion of sexual harassment leaves out?134 
Were we writing on a blank slate, substituting an umbrella term 
like “sex-based harassment” might well be better: more accurate, less 
easily misleading than the term “sexual harassment.” But the slate isn’t 
blank; it bears the marks of one of the most widespread popular legal 
education efforts in the country. Aside from traffic laws and drivers’ ed-
ucation, perhaps no topic is the subject of more mandatory legal train-
ings than sexual harassment. Furthermore, in major media outlets like 
the New York Times, as well as on social media, “sexual harassment” is 
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the term most often deployed. The terminological train having left the 
station, the best we can do is to guide its tracks. 
To step back a moment: there are three possibilities for describing 
the varieties of harassment described in the previous two parts. First, 
we could take the route offered by the New York Times, defining “sexual 
harassment” to encompass only behaviors “of a sexual nature,” and us-
ing another term such as “gender harassment” to cover everything else 
that is sex-based but not sexualized. Second, we could follow the recent 
EEOC task force, whose 2016 report follows many social scientists in 
relying on “sex-based harassment” or “harassment based on sex” as its 
descriptively accurate umbrella term, and then uses “unwanted sexual 
attention,” “sexual coercion,” and “gender harassment” as sub-catego-
ries under that umbrella.135 Third, we could follow the National Acade-
mies report, which adopts the same three sub-categories, but treats 
them all as types of sexual harassment.136 
To see all three of these approaches in action, we can look to the 
biggest economy and labor pool in the country: California, whose non-
discrimination laws, although progressive, still hedge on the meaning 
of “sexual harassment.” That ambiguity creates an opening for those 
who, for their own purposes, may prefer to limit the term to its narrower 
sexualized meaning, as shown below. 
Overall, California law contains a broad definition of sexual har-
assment, much like the one for which we advocate. California courts, 
like their federal counterparts, have long recognized that “[s]exual har-
assment does not necessarily involve sexual conduct. It need not have 
anything to do with lewd acts, double entendres or sexual advances.”137 
In addition, the dozen or so bills recently enacted in California in re-
sponse to the #MeToo movement have largely avoided singling out sex-
ual harassment for special treatment in comparison to other forms of 
sex discrimination—though media reporting on those bills often misses 
this fact. The Sacramento Bee, for example, has described Senate Bill 
820 as “prohibit[ing] secret settlements and non-disclosure agreements 
in sexual harassment cases.”138 In fact, the bill, which became law in 
September 2018, applies not only to sexual harassment in professional 
relationships outside the workplace (those defined in Civil Code § 51.9), 
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(2018), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/sexual-harassment-law-after-metoo [https://perma. 
cc/XA8K-S63F]. 
 138 See, e.g., Alexei Koseff, California Bans Secret Settlements in Sexual Harassment Cases, 
SACRAMENTO BEE (Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-aler 
t/article218830265.html [https://perma.cc/YPE6-9GSW]. 
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but also to harassment or discrimination based on sex in workplaces 
and housing as defined in Government Code Sections 12940 and 
12955.139 Confidential settlements are thus banned in all cases involv-
ing sex discrimination. Newly enacted bills banning retaliation against 
whistleblowers,140 and bonuses or raises contingent on liability waiv-
ers,141 have a similarly broad sweep. The latter bill also expands liabil-
ity for harassment, formerly just sexual harassment, by non-employ-
ees.142 
Civil Code § 51.9, the California state law that provides a cause of 
action for people sexually harassed by their teachers, accountants, law-
yers, directors, and others with whom they have a professional relation-
ship, defines sexual harassment capaciously to include “sexual ad-
vances, solicitations, sexual requests, demands for sexual 
compliance . . . or . . . other verbal, visual, or physical conduct of a sex-
ual nature or of a hostile nature based on gender.”143 
But California’s employment discrimination law terms things dif-
ferently. The statute defines the umbrella term as “‘harassment’ be-
cause of sex,” which, it says, “includes sexual harassment, gender har-
assment, and harassment based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related 
medical conditions.”144 In 1993, when this language was added, the Leg-
islature noted that the state’s “prohibitions against harassment be-
cause of sex have always included sexual harassment, gender harass-
ment, and pregnancy harassment.”145 The Legislature only made the 
subcategories explicit, it said, “to more clearly identify them, for pur-
poses of education and training, as harassment because of sex.”146 This 
approach is thus similar to the one employed by the EEOC task force 
which uses sex-based harassment as the overarching term and enumer-
ates specific subsets of conduct within it. 
 
 139 See Settlement Agreements, Confidentiality, S.B. 820 2017–2018 Leg. Sess. (CA 2018), 
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB820 [https://per 
ma.cc/RVR4-GJPD]. 
 140 See Whistleblowers, S.B. 419, 2017–2018 Leg. Sess. (CA 2018), https://leginfo.legislature.ca 
.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB419 [https://perma.cc/9VHY-FEBS], (defining 
“discriminatory harassment” as “harassment based on race, religious creed, color, national origin, 
ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital 
status, sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression, age, sexual orientation, or military and 
veteran status” and protecting those who report it from retaliation by state legislators). 
 141 See Unlawful Employment Practices, S.B.1300, 2017–2018 Leg. Sess. (CA 2018), 
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB1300 [https://per 
ma.cc/G7UN-FQXY] (protecting the right to “right to disclose information about unlawful acts in 
the workplace, including, but not limited to, sexual harassment”). 
 142 Id. 
 143 CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.9(a)(2)–(3) (West 2018). 
 144 CAL. GOV. CODE § 12940(j)(4)(C) (West 2018). 
 145 CAL. ASSEMB. BILL 675 § 1(c) (1993) (emphasis added). 
 146 Id., at § 1(d). 
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Despite the progressive intent of this final approach, the California 
example shows how it can be unduly limited. For even though the over-
arching definition of harassment is broad, California’s increasingly ro-
bust education and training requirements do not mandate training 
about “harassment because of sex.” What California law actually re-
quires is that employers display posters and offer training on sexual 
harassment.147 
The California example illustrates a key danger of placing “sexual 
harassment” alongside “gender harassment” (and other terms). Treat-
ing sexual harassment and gender harassment as subsets of some 
larger category with a different name, even an accurate name like “har-
assment because of sex,” creates ambiguity that can prove harmful. The 
danger is that the awareness built up around sexual harassment—
through media coverage, through the #MeToo movement, and not least, 
through employers’ practices under laws like those in California, which 
mandate legal training for nearly every employee in the state—will fo-
cus on a narrow sexualized conception of sexual harassment that dis-
tinguishes it from gender harassment, instead of threating them to-
gether. 
This is not merely a theoretical concern. There is evidence that Cal-
ifornia employment discrimination law, the language of which was 
drafted to clarify the many forms sex-based harassment can take, in-
stead ends up not only separating the terms, but devoting vastly more 
attention to one form of harassment—the sexualized variety, termed 
“sexual harassment”—over the others. Consider, for example, the sex-
ual harassment posters and brochures distributed by the California De-
partment of Fair Employment and Housing. They lead with a list of six 
“behaviors that may be sexual harassment,” all of which reinforce a sex-
ualized definition:148 
1) Unwanted sexual advances 
2) Offering employment benefits in exchange for sexual favors 
 
 147 See CAL. GOV. CODE §§ 12950, 12950.1 (West 2018). Senate Bill 1343 expanded the training 
requirement to employers with five or more employees rather than fifty or more, as before. The 
Bill also instructs the state’s Department of Fair Employment and Housing to develop its own 
online training courses “on the prevention of sexual harassment in the workplace.” S.B. 1343, 
2017–2018 Leg. Sess. (CA 2018). Notably, the law requires that sexual harassment training in-
clude coverage of “harassment based on gender identity, gender expression, and sexual orienta-
tion.” See CAL. GOV. CODE § 12950.1(c). 
 148 Sexual Harassment, CAL. DEP’T OF FAIR EMPL. & HOUSING (Dec. 2018), https://www.dfeh.ca. 
gov/wpcontent/uploads/sites/32/2018/12/DFEH_SexualHarassmentPoster.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y 
8YC-ZEVW]; Behaviors That May Be Sexual Harassment, CAL. DEP’T OF FAIR EMPL. & HOUSING 
(Dec. 2018), https://www.dfeh.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/32/2018/12/DFEH_SexualHarassm 
entPamphlet.pdf [https://perma.cc/UPJ8-K5XE]. 
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3) Leering; gestures; or displaying sexually suggestive objects, 
pictures, cartoons, or posters 
4) Derogatory comments, epithets, slurs, or jokes 
5) Graphic comments, sexually degrading words, or suggestive 
or obscene messages or invitations 
6) Physical touching or assault, as well as impeding or blocking 
movements. 
 The fourth and sixth of these behaviors could be interpreted to 
extend beyond sexualized content. But the Department’s online “Sexual 
Harassment FAQs” page, which expands on some of the categories, em-
phasizes that they refer to “[v]erbal abuse of a sexual nature, graphic 
verbal commentaries about an individual’s body, [and] sexually degrad-
ing words used to describe an individual.”149 The Department goes on to 
emphasize: “State regulations define sexual harassment as unwanted 
sexual advances, or visual, verbal or physical conduct of a sexual na-
ture,” removing any lingering doubt about what kinds of behavior the 
Department seeks to target under its training requirements.150   
 Thus, the regulatory approach uses, and encourages California 
employers to use, an explicitly sexualized definition of harassment in 
their policies and training programs, notwithstanding the broader 
reach of California law. 
Insofar as California employers are adopting and promulgating a 
sexualized notion of sexual harassment in their policies and trainings, 
they are not alone. Sixteen years ago, Schultz comprehensively ana-
lyzed the content of employers’ sexual harassment policies reported in 
research surveys or otherwise publicly available.151 She found that U.S. 
companies had almost universally adopted policies prohibiting sexual 
harassment and that these policies “define harassment exclusively in 
terms of sexual conduct (as opposed to conduct that discriminates on 
the basis of sex more generally).”152 At that time, “most of the . . . poli-
cies track[ed] the language of the EEOC guidelines, which, as we saw 
earlier, define harassment in terms of “[u]nwelcome sexual advances, 
 
 149 Sexual Harassment FAQs, CAL. DEP’T OF FAIR EMPL. & HOUSING (last visited Feb. 12, 2019), 
https://www.dfeh.ca.gov/resources/frequently-asked-questions/employment-faqs/sexual-harassm 
ent-faqs/ [https://perma.cc/2TJ9-G558]. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, supra note 24, at 2094 & n.96 (citing policies reflected in 
surveys); id. at 2098 (discussing other published policies). 
 152 Id. at 2094 & n.97 (noting that, in those days, employers and the researchers who surveyed 
them defined sexual harassment exclusively in sexual terms). 
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requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sex-
ual nature.”153 The policies proscribed a wide range of sexual talk and 
behavior, and referred to sexualized examples154 that would not neces-
sarily amount to legally actionable harassment. 
This analysis is not obsolete; a similar finding emerges in a recent 
study also. In an extensive content analysis of sexual harassment train-
ings offered by employers between 1980 and 2016, Elizabeth Tippett 
found that even after the Supreme Court’s 1998 decision in Oncale, 59 
percent of the sampled training programs continued to define sexual 
harassment in sexual terms, often including among their examples of 
prohibited harassment sexual jokes, flirting, relationships, and com-
ments about appearance that would not be counted as sexual harass-
ment in any court.155 Only half of these trainings even mention discrim-
ination. Reiterating a point made earlier by Schultz,156 Professor 
Tippett writes, “harassment has become unmoored from its larger pur-
pose of ensuring access to equal workplace opportunity.”157 
Recent research also confirms newer iterations of another problem 
documented years ago by Schultz: “disaggregation” of evidence of sexual 
and non-sexual forms of misconduct.158 In a perceptive student note, El-
eanor Frisch demonstrates that this problem arises when state laws 
separately identify sexual harassment as something distinct from non-
sexualized harassment on the basis of sex.159 Looking to cases in Mas-
sachusetts, Michigan, and Minnesota, Frisch shows how courts have 
created entirely bifurcated pleading and evidentiary regimes for the two 
types of harassment. “[M]erely mentioning ‘sexual harassment’ in 
pleadings can be fatal to” a case involving non-sexualized harassment, 
she argues.160 
These examples show only a couple of the pitfalls that may arise 
when “sexual harassment” is conceptualized exclusively in sexual 
 
 153 Id. at 2094 & n.98 (discussing policies reported in research surveys and citing 1980 EEOC 
guidelines); id. at 2098–2099 (reporting same finding about other reviewed policies). 
 154 Id. at 2095–2099. 
 155 Elizabeth Tippett, Harassment Trainings: A Content Analysis, 39 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. 
L. 481, 511 (2018) (“Even in current trainings, the large majority of examples are devoted to sexual 
conduct, equally divided between severe forms of sexual harassment—like physical harassment, 
or quid pro quo harassment—and relatively less severe conduct—like suggestive jokes, comments 
about appearance, and inappropriate emails.”). 
 156 Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, supra note 24, at 2119 (noting that “sexual harassment 
law has taken on a life of its own, uprooted from the larger project of gender equality that animates 
Title VII”). 
 157 Tippett, Harassment Trainings, supra note 155, at 511. 
 158 Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 6, at 1711 (demonstrating how 
such disaggregation works to plaintiffs’ disadvantage in the federal courts). 
 159 Eleanor Frisch, State Sexual Harassment Definitions and Disaggregation of Sex Discrimi-
nation Claims, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1943 (2014) (showing the disaggregation problem in state courts). 
 160 Id. at 1962. 
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terms. Nice as it might be to use a more generic overarching term like 
“sex-based harassment” to refer to the full panoply of harassment that 
occurs because of sex, or to use a parallel term like “gender harassment” 
to describe certain non-sexual forms, there is no denying that the term 
“sexual harassment” has achieved a place in legal and popular culture 
that is unlikely to be rivaled. By now, “sexual harassment” is a familiar 
category of antidiscrimination law at both the federal and state levels. 
“Sexual harassment” is what most workers in the country are now 
trained to avoid and prevent.161 Thanks to #MeToo, “sexual harass-
ment” is part of the national conversation like never before. The im-
portant thing, then, is to make sure that within this conversation, 
within the law, and within the policies and trainings so common in 
nearly every workplace (and campus), people are talking about the right 
thing: the entire spectrum of ways that gender is policed through har-
assment that sometimes is sexualized, but even more often is not. 
These days, both the #MeToo movement and major media outlets 
like the New York Times can take credit for shining a spotlight on sex-
ual harassment. People are talking about the problem again, and 
rightly so. A time when everyone is talking about sexual harassment is 
not the best time to change the term being used. But it is a crucial time 
to make sure the term is properly understood, so the problem of sexual 
harassment can be properly confronted. 
CONCLUSION 
Two decades ago, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment prompted 
scores of women to write letters and emails describing how they recog-
nized in their own lives the range of gendered harassment the article 
described. The authors were grateful that someone had acknowledged 
their lived experience—and had called out the harassment they faced 
as something harmful, and illegal. 
In the age of #MeToo, people remain hungry for media representa-
tions that accurately reflect their everyday realities. The attention the 
#MeToo movement has given to sexual assault is necessary and valua-
ble. But to collapse sexual harassment into sexualized advances and 
assaults is to ignore many of the ways that most women, and many men, 
experience hostility in the workplace (and beyond). To ignore those sto-
ries is to fail to recognize and understand the variety of ways in which 
gender gets policed, and gendered spaces get maintained. 
 
 161 Similar issues are presented under Title IX. See Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harass-
ment, Again, supra note 6, at n.19. 
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This is why what gets named as “sexual harassment” matters, 
whether it be in the New York Times or in mandated workplace train-
ings. Both help shape popular understanding. Thus, choices about how 
to define and talk about sexual harassment end up affecting what ordi-
nary employees and others feel they can and should report. And since 
popular understanding in turn seeps back and shapes the law, media 
reports and workplace policies on sexual harassment end up affecting 
the actions bystanders, employers, agencies, and courts feel compelled 
to stop. 
By adopting an outdated conception of sexual harassment—one 
that most of the legal system and social science have moved beyond—
the media misses a chance to educate the public and policy makers 
about the real scope and causes of sexual harassment. The New York 
Times may be right in urging its readers to engage in discussion about 
sexual harassment and “agree on definitions.” But when it comes to sex-
ual harassment, the definition shouldn’t be the one used by the Times 
itself. 
